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This study explores the patterns of news consumption of Russian users of Vkontakte, the 
most popular social media platform in Russia, based on a sample of 55,344 users. The 
analysis is conducted via a combination of network analysis techniques. It demonstrates 
that the majority of Vkontakte users do not subscribe to news sources, demonstrating 
that there is a politically apathetic majority and news-interested minority. And news 
subscribers are polarized along political lines. There is a distinct group of users who 
subscribe to pro-opposition-leaning politicized sources more than other users do. This 
study builds on research on polarization, selective exposure, and the role of social media 
in authoritarian regimes. It provides new empirical evidence on the way that selective 
exposure and polarization manifest themselves on a non-Western platform in an 
authoritarian state. 
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In recent years, researchers have extensively examined polarization on social media (social 
networking sites [SNS]) manifested in echo chambering and selective exposure. However, the findings are 
contradictory; some studies confirm the existence of echo chambers on SNS (e.g., Schmidt et al., 2017), 
whereas others disprove it (e.g., Goel, Mason, & Watts, 2010). One possible explanation is that the intensity 
of polarization is contextual, differing among platforms and countries. To date, most empirical research on 
the phenomena has been conducted on Twitter or Facebook in the context of the U.S. or other liberal 
democracies. In this article, I aim to partially fill the research gap by providing empirical evidence on 
selective exposure and polarization in news consumption among Russian users of Vkontakte (vk.com), a 
Russian online social media and social networking service based in Saint Petersburg that is the most popular 
SNS in Russia. 
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Besides expanding the research on polarization on social media beyond Western platforms and 
contexts, examining the news consumption in the Russian segment of Vkontakte sheds light on the 
perspectives and limitations of social media sites as news dissemination and political mobilization channels 
in a consolidated authoritarian regime. SNS can be helpful tools for protest mobilization in authoritarian 
regimes (Ruijgrok, 2017), but they can also be used by authoritarian governments to push forward their 
agenda and silence dissent (Gunitsky, 2015; Pearce & Kendzior, 2012; Tufekci, 2017). 
 
In this study, I first present the state of research on polarization manifested in echo chambering 
and selective exposure, as well as on news dissemination through social media in authoritarian regimes. I 
also describe the role played by social media in the protest mobilization in Russia over the past decade. 
Next, I outline my research question and hypotheses. Finally, I conduct empirical analysis, applying network 
analysis techniques to the data on 55,344 Russian users of Vkontakte. 
 
Selective Exposure and Polarization 
 
The growth in the amount and the variety of available media in recent decades has made it easier 
for people to find news sources that are consistent with their attitudes (Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, 
Schwarz, & Cook, 2012). In these high-choice media environments, people tend to demonstrate partisan 
biases in consumption, choosing only media sites that align with their views (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008). The 
phenomenon in which people seek information that supports their existing beliefs and avoid information that 
contradicts them is called selective exposure (Stroud, 2008). 
 
The psychological underpinnings of selective exposure are related to cognitive dissonance. When 
presented with information that is inconsistent with their beliefs, people feel uncomfortable (Festinger, 
1957). To avoid unpleasant feelings, they try to expose themselves only to information that aligns with their 
values and attitudes (Klapper, 1960). Another psychological explanation for selective exposure is that people 
employ it as a strategy to reduce their cognitive efforts put into information processing (Smith, Fabrigar, & 
Norris, 2008). People’s information-processing capacities are limited (Lang, 2000), and information that is 
consistent with their existing beliefs is easier to process (Edwards & Smith, 1996). Thus, selective exposure 
helps people save their mental resources and avoid cognitive overload. Empirical evidence confirms that 
selective exposure is present on social media platforms (An, Quercia, Cha, Gummadi, & Crowcroft, 2014; 
Grömping, 2014). Besides engaging in selective exposure, people demonstrate the tendency for homophily—
that is, surrounding themselves with individuals who have characteristics similar to theirs, such as gender, 
socioeconomic status, moral values, and political orientations (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). 
 
Selective exposure and homophily in the online sphere might lead to the formation of the so-called 
echo chambers—communities of like-minded individuals where people are exposed to opinions and ideas 
consistent with their views—which in turn can increase polarization (e.g., Garimella, Morales, Gionis, & 
Mathioudakis, 2018; Grömping, 2014; Sunstein, 2001). A growing body of research, however, contests 
polarizing effects of echo chambering and selective exposure on social media, showing that SNS can diversify 
users’ media diets and make them less polarized through incidental exposure to opposing opinions and 
increased access to media with different types of political stance (Barberá, 2015; Dubois & Blank, 2018; 
Flaxman, Goel, & Rao, 2016; Fletcher & Nielsen, 2018; Nelson & Webster, 2017). The scholarly debate on 
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the intensity of selective exposure and echo chambering and their potentially polarizing effects is thus 
ongoing. However, to date, research on these phenomena has focused on Twitter and Facebook in the 
context of Western liberal democracies, primarily the U.S. Nonetheless, the evidence from these contexts 
has limited generalizability. It does not apply to other platforms and to states with different political 
systems—for instance, authoritarian regimes. At the same time, understanding how information is 
consumed on social media in authoritarian states is of critical importance. The SNS in such countries play a 
crucial role in civic mobilization and circumvention of censorship by providing channels of news dissemination 
to the opposition and independent media. Because political systems in authoritarian countries are very 
different from those of liberal democracies, polarization on social media there, if manifested, is also likely 
to occur along different lines. Although research based on the data from U.S. finds evidence of left-wing 
versus right-wing polarization, in authoritarian regimes it is more likely to occur along the progovernment 
versus pro-opposition lines. Therefore, research on political polarization on SNS in different contexts and 
different platforms is pivotal for a better understanding of the phenomena in general. 
 
Social Media Platforms as News Disseminators in Authoritarian Regimes 
 
SNS and the Internet are positively correlated with the protest potential, especially in authoritarian 
regimes (Howard et al., 2011). Nonetheless, these channels are just tools—what really matters is the 
content spread through them. Ruijgrok (2017, p. 17) identifies four causal mechanisms that explain how 
the Internet, through increased access to information, leads to more protests in authoritarian regimes: (1) 
lowering the risk to the opposition in coordinating demonstrations, (2) changing citizens’ attitudes by 
exposing them to alternative information, (3) removing information uncertainty among potential protestors, 
and (4) presenting users with videos and pictures, which can be especially powerful. Besides, social media 
helps activists circumvent the mainstream media “blackout” and attract public attention (Breuer, Landman, 
& Farquhar, 2015). 
 
Though social media increases people’s access to information and can have a mobilizing effect on 
citizens in authoritarian regimes, contemporary autocrats have learned how to use the new technologies in 
pursuit of their own interests. For instance, China and Russia practice what is referred to as networked 
authoritarianism; they leverage “ICTs [information and communication technologies] and media regulation 
to carefully control the expression of dissent in a way that gives the impression of limited freedom of 
expression without allowing dissent to gain traction” (Maréchal, 2017, p. 36). Autocratic regimes resort to 
censorship by disinformation—not by trying to block certain content, but rather by distracting citizens from 
it by flooding online public spheres with fake news and trivialities (Tufekci, 2017). They also compete with 
online dissent and try to undermine the credibility of the online media that presents accurate information 
(MacKinnon, 2011; Maréchal, 2017; Pearce & Kendzior, 2012). 
 
Research on censorship in authoritarian regimes shows that the aim of propaganda is not only 
indoctrination but also a signal to the public that the state is strong enough, thus discouraging citizens from 
revolting (Huang, 2015) and convincing them that the autocrat is sufficiently competent to govern (Guriev 
& Treisman, 2015). 
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Previous research on the role of social media in authoritarian regimes, as outlined above, suggests 
the following: (1) Social media is a powerful tool for disseminating information and circumventing 
censorship; (2) SNS have political mobilization potential because access to the political information provided 
by social media can lead to the mobilization of users who were exposed to such information; and (3) 
autocratic governments aim to censor social media to curb mobilization potential, not to stop the spread of 
information per se. 
 
Examining the consumption of political content—including hard news—in authoritarian states is 
necessary to better comprehend how the mechanisms described above work in practice and interplay with 
phenomena such as selective exposure and polarization on SNS observed in other contexts, in case these 
phenomena are manifested among social media users in authoritarian states as well. 
 
Background Information: Russia and Vkontakte 
 
The hypotheses presented in this study are partially built on the characteristics of the Russian social 
media sphere in general, and the examined Vkontakte platform in particular. Thus, before moving on to the 
hypotheses, I briefly outline these characteristics and my reasons for choosing Russia and Vkontakte as the 
constituents of this case study. 
 
In 2011, only 49% of Russians had Internet access (World Bank, n.d.); 20% and 7% named online 
media and social media, respectively, among their primary news sources, whereas 92% said that TV was 
their primary source of news (“Istochniki informatsii,” 2017). Since 2011, the level of Internet penetration 
in Russia has increased significantly, as well as Russians’ eagerness to rely on social media for the news. In 
2016, 73% of Russians had Internet access (World Bank, n.d.). In 2018, 21% and 27% of Russians, 
respectively, said that they obtained their news from social media and online media (Levada Center, 2018). 
 
On the one hand, the increase in the number of Internet and social media users should have 
increased the protest mobilization potential of SNS because information from pro-opposition actors 
circulated on social media in 2019 has a potentially broader reach than it had in 2011. On the other hand, 
since 2011, the Russian government has increased its efforts to obstruct the use of social media for protest 
mobilization (see Klyueva, 2016; Reuter & Szakonyi, 2015; Sanovich, Stukal, & Tucker, 2018; Soldatov & 
Borogan, 2015; Tselikov, 2014). Despite the growth from 7% in 2011 to 21% in 2018, the percentage of 
people relying on social media for news is still meager compared with those in other countries (see, e.g., 
Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, Levy, & Nielsen, 2018). 
 
Despite the relatively low levels of social media usage in 2011 and the increased control over the 
Internet in subsequent years, Russia has witnessed two waves of SNS-enabled protests—one in 2011–12 
and the other in 2017. The exact role of different social media platforms in the 2011–12 protest mobilization 
is disputable. Some researchers argue that Western social media platforms, namely Facebook and Twitter, 
were the most crucial to the Russian protests of 2011–12, and Russian social media platforms, such as 
Vkontakte or Odnoklassniki (odnoklassniki.ru), were of negligible importance (Gainous, Wagner, & Ziegler, 
2018; Reuter & Szakonyi, 2015; White & McAllister, 2014). Others demonstrate that Vkontakte usage also 
increased its mobilization potential (Enikolopov, Makarin, & Petrova, 2016). Nonetheless, there is unilateral 
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agreement about the importance of SNS for protest mobilization. Researchers have argued that increased 
control over the Internet in Russia has hindered its protest mobilization potential (Reuter & Szakonyi, 2015). 
However, the massive social-media-enabled protests of 2017 contradict this view. In 2017, the largest 
protest action since 2012 occurred on March 26, when the opposition leader Alexey Navalny, who is de facto 
banned from appearing on national TV or the major state media (Ragozin, 2017), called for the protests 
through SNS (Sebastian, 2017). 
 
The Russian social media sphere can be perceived as a battlefield between the state and pro-
opposition activists, making it a particularly relevant case for the study of news consumption and polarization 
on SNS in contexts other than liberal democracies. In this article, I focus on news consumption on the 
Russian social media platform Vkontakte. In December 2017, 65% of social network users in Russia were 
registered on Vkontakte, while only 20% and 7%, respectively, had Facebook and Twitter accounts 
(Berishvili, 2018). Despite the contested role of Vkontakte in the protest mobilization of 2011–12, there is 
an indication that since then the influence of pro-opposition actors on the platform has remarkably 
increased. In 2011–12, the protesters relied mostly on Facebook and Twitter because these two platforms 
contained more political information than those presented in the Russian Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki 
platforms (Gainous et al., 2018; Reuter & Szakonyi, 2015; White & McAllister, 2014). There are indications 
that by 2017, the situation had changed. For instance, in 2011, Alexey Navalny’s Vkontakte page had around 
60 followers (Reuter & Szakonyi, 2015). In subsequent years, the number of Navalny’s Vkontakte followers 
surged, reaching 396,000 users in July 2018; in comparison, his Facebook page at that time had 408,000 
followers. His recent posts have received similar numbers of “likes” on both platforms. Because Navalny is 
the most prominent Russian opposition activist as of 2019, and he was the organizer of the protests of 2017, 
his popularity is a good proxy for the influence exerted by the opposition on a given social media platform 
in Russia. 
 
Vkontakte is a suitable case for this study for two primary reasons. First, it is the social media 
platform with the highest share of users in Russia. Thus, the examination of Vkontakte allows capturing the 
patterns of social media news consumption that is more representative of the general Russian population 
than the analysis of other platforms would. Second, it has a significant presence of pro-opposition actors. 
This proves that Vkontakte can be a relevant channel for the spread of antigovernment information and for 
protest mobilization. Therefore, the platform is worth investigating with regard to the possible effects of 
SNS in authoritarian states. Besides, in contrast to the cases of Facebook and Twitter, selective exposure 
and polarization on Vkontakte have not yet been explored in detail. Finally, because of less restrictive API 
limits, Vkontakte allows for the gathering of more data about more representative samples of users than 
Facebook and Twitter currently do (see Data and Methods section), making it a valuable source for 
communication research. 
 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
In authoritarian states, social media can be a vital censorship circumvention channel. The 
decentralized nature of SNS makes it difficult for the state to monitor all the content spread through them. 
Thus, they allow for the spread of government criticisms and the news that are censored by the government-
controlled mainstream media. For this reason, people in media environments with limited freedom tend to 
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seek information online (Behrouzian, Nisbet, Dal, & Çarkoğlu, 2016). There is evidence that in countries 
with nonfree media systems (Reporters Without Borders, 2018), higher percentages of citizens rely on social 
media for the news. In the majority of countries included in the Reuters Digital News Report (Newman et 
al., 2018), around 50% of the people claimed they access the news on SNS. In authoritarian states or those 
with nonfree media, such as Turkey, Singapore, or Hungary, the percentage is much higher than average, 
reaching about 70%. Russia was not included in the Reuters Digital News Report, so it is impossible to 
directly compare the statistics in Russia with those of other authoritarian states. Furthermore, the Reuters 
Digital News Report relies on survey data and SNS there include multiple platforms. This study focuses on 
directly observed digital trace data from a single platform. The discrepancies make it difficult to use Digital 
News Report data as a benchmark to assess how the share of news-interested Russian Vkontakte users 
compares with global averages. Hence, here I formulate a research question about the percentage of news-
interested users on Vkontakte, and refrain from hypothesizing how high it might be in comparison with other 
countries: 
 
RQ1: How many Russian users of Vkontakte subscribe to news pages? 
 
Though the Russian state has tightened its control over the Internet since 2011, the opposition still 
manages to use SNS to spread information critical of the government and mobilize people for the protests, 
as shown by the 2017 campaign. At the same time, the social-media-enabled campaigns in both 2011–12 
and 2017 failed to achieve their declared primary goals (new and fair Duma elections in 2011–12 and an 
investigation into the corruption affairs of Russian prime minister Dmitry Medvedev in 2017). Nonetheless, 
the 2017 protests helped increase Navalny’s recognition and popularity, and his team’s Anti-Corruption 
Foundation currently has offices all over the country. Analysis of Navalny’s 2018 presidential campaign 
shows that, given the obstacles faced by Navalny and his team, their mobilization power was impressive, 
but the movement still remained marginal in terms of the share of population reached and mobilized by 
their messages, largely due to overall political apathy (Dollbaum, Semenov, & Sirotkina, 2018). I suggest 
that the divide between the politically mobilized pro-opposition minority, including those reached and 
mobilized by Navalny’s campaigns, and the apathetic majority that exists in Russian society is reflected on 
Vkontakte as well. In this regard, I present the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: On Vkontakte, a minority of users expose themselves to politicized content from nongovernmental 
actors more than users from other groups do. 
 
In Russia, both progovernment and pro-opposition actors struggle to gain more influence on social 
media (see, e.g., Spaiser, Chadefaux, Donnay, Russmann, & Helbing, 2017). The state attempts to push 
forward its agenda through dedicated groups and pages of state-controlled media on SNS. The opposition 
and the independent press strive to circumvent censorship by disseminating their messages on social media 
platforms. The conflict between the two groups and their respective agendas is evident. The selective 
exposure phenomenon in such a situation could lead to the increased polarization in news consumption, 
where each group’s supporters would avoid the media sources that they perceive as belonging to a “different 
camp.” Building on this, I propose the second hypothesis: 
 
H2: News consumers on Vkontakte are polarized along progovernment versus pro-opposition lines. 
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Data and Methods 
 
This study is based on data about the public pages followed by Vkontakte users. Data were collected 
in May–June 2018 through the Vkontakte open API using the R programming language and the vkR package 
(Sorokin & Antonov, 2016). I collected a data sample of 55,344 randomly chosen Russian Vkontakte users 
and the public pages they follow. To avoid sampling bias, the data were collected based on a computer-
generated random sample of numeric user IDs, which were then filtered to correspond only to users who 
identified Russia as their country of residence on their public profiles. This technique allowed me to draw a 
representative sample of Russian Vkontakte users in general. Vkontakte assigns user IDs sequentially, based 
on the date when a user registered on the platform (the first registered account has ID number 1, the 500th 
account is assigned 500, and so on2). For this study, I generated a random sample of 250,000 numeric IDs 
from 0 to 460 million, queried the data on them, and extracted the Russian users. At the time of the data 
collection, there were around 480 million registered users. However, I excluded the IDs of the most recently 
registered 20 million users from the computer-generated sample. The data were collected several months 
after the Russian presidential elections, and there was a high probability that the most recently registered 
accounts might be bots created to alter the social media landscape during the election campaign. 
 
The sample thus had 55,344 Russian users with randomly chosen registration dates. A similar 
sampling technique cannot be applied to Facebook and Twitter. First, in contrast to Vkontakte, they do not 
sequentially assign user IDs (Shontell, 2014; “Twitter IDs,” n.d.). Second, Vkontakte’s API at the time of 
data collection had no limits in terms of the number of calls to it within a specific time frame. Thus, it was 
possible to query the data on many users, select only those who stated Russia as their country of residence, 
and collect the data about the pages they followed, all within two weeks. With the restrictions of Twitter’s 
API (“Rate Limits,” n.d.), the same process could take up to several months. Facebook’s API since 2018 has 
become increasingly restrictive, and it is challenging for researchers to even gain access to collect data 
(Bastos & Walker, 2018). Hence, the novel sampling approach used in this article applies only to Vkontakte 
or other platforms with sequential IDs and preferably less restrictive APIs. 
 
To answer RQ1, I checked how many users out of the initial sample followed media pages and 
popular political blogs. To do so, I compiled a list of Vkontakte pages of the most cited Russian media outlets 
according to the Medialogia report of April 2018 (Medialogia, 2018; when the list was compiled, this was the 
latest publicly available report). Medialogia is an independent company that publishes monthly reports on 
the popularity rankings of Russian media outlets based on the number of citations. The reports cover all 
types of media outlets, ranging from TV channels and radio stations to online media and blogs. For instance, 
the list includes a blog by Alexey Navalny, as well as de facto Russian media outlets that are not officially 
registered in Russia, such as the Latvia-based independent Meduza. I also added to the list the pages of 
media sources that were not included in the Medialogia report, but that had more than 1 million followers 
on Vkontakte. The final list consists of 97 media outlets (see the Appendix). Next, I checked how many 
users from the Vkontakte data set followed at least one of the media sources on the list to calculate the 
percentage of news-subscribing Vkontakte users. 
 
 
2 The full catalogue of Vkontakte users listed by their numeric IDs is available at https://vk.com/catalog.php. 
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The Medialogia (2018) list is quite comprehensive, but does not include the sources that exist only 
in the form of social media pages—for instance, Vkontakte-based political blogs, such as Lentach 
(vk.com/oldlentach). Thus, simple filtering based on the Medialogia list is prone to selection bias. To expand 
the scope of the analysis and gain more insights, I applied network analysis to the sample of 55,344 
Vkontakte users and the data on the pages to which they subscribed. For this analysis, only the public pages 
with at least 10 subscribers in the sample (0.02% of the initial sample of users3) were selected to reduce 
sparsity. This manipulation was necessary because the analysis of the raw data was not feasible. First, it 
would require too much computational power, and without using a supercomputer, the analysis would be 
impossible. Second, for the research questions addressed in this study, only relatively popular pages are 
relevant. In this study, I focus on the pages with a broad reach that have a potential influence on the 
audience; thus, minor pages with a few followers are beyond its scope. 
 
After this manipulation, the number of unique pages in the sample decreased from 864,972 to 
32,800, and the number of users dropped from 55,344 to 48,637. Therefore, the sparsity of the network 
was sufficiently reduced through a significant decrease in the number of pages, making the data 
computationally feasible to analyze. At the same time, the sample size decreased by 12%, which was 
significant. The remaining subset of users was still large enough for the analysis. 
 
Before proceeding to the immediate analysis, I checked whether the page distribution by the 
number of followers in the sample followed the Zipf’s law (also referred to as power law). This was done to 
test for the presence of bots on the data. The popularity distribution should follow the Zipfian distribution 
because following a power-law distribution is a typical property for social network data (Barabási & Albert, 
1999; Muchnik et al., 2013); otherwise, the sample is likely influenced by bots (Rastogi, 2016) or the data 
are corrupted in some other way. Figure 1 shows the density plot of the popularity distribution of the pages 
in the sample, which follows the Zipfian distribution. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the data are not 
influenced by bots. It has to be noted, though, that Rastogi’s (2016) study is not peer reviewed, so the bot-
detection method used here is not properly validated, which is a limitation of this study. However, because 
no accessible tools for bot detection on Vkontakte (similar to Botometer [see https://botometer.iuni.iu 
.edu/#!/] for Twitter) exist, I opted for Rastogi’s method here, even if its validity is not confirmed. 
 
 
3 The benchmark was selected experimentally; this share appeared to be the most optimal when taking into 
account the balance between computational power necessary for the analysis and the share of data omitted 
after this manipulation with the original data set. 
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Figure 1. Density plot—the distribution of pages by the number of followers in the sample. 
 
Of the cleaned subset of 48,637 users and 32,800 pages with at least 10 followers in the sample, 
I built a directed network of the social media users and the pages they followed. Each node represents either 
a user or a social media page. There is an edge between a user node and a page node if the user follows 
the page. I applied an automatic modularity-based community detection algorithm implemented in Gephi 
(Blondel, Guillaume, Lambiotte, & Lefebvre, 2008) to divide the network into communities based on the 
network structure. The pages inside each community are connected to the pages from the same community 
more than from the others. In the present context, it means that they share audiences with each other more 
than with the pages from different communities. Thus, the users from one community follow significantly 
more pages from it than from the other communities. To test H1, I was explicitly interested whether the 
users who subscribe to politicized content coming from media and actors not associated with Russian 
government would form a separate, distinct group within the broader network structure. By politicized 
content I mean hard news and politically charged messages from independent media such as Meduza, NGOs 
such as Roskomsvoboda and political actors such as Navalny’s team. After the network was divided into 
communities, I examined the top 70–100 (in terms of the number of followers from the sample) social media 
pages in each community to identify the dominant topics addressed by the pages in each group. 
 
To test H2, I focused on news-interested users. I took the subset of users who followed at least 
one media source from the Medialogia (2018) list. I then applied the audience duplication approach (see 
Ksiazek, 2011; Webster & Ksiazek, 2012) to the data. This audience-centric network analysis approach has 
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proven effective for the studies on audience fragmentation and has been successfully applied to different 
types of media outlets, including digital media (e.g., Fletcher & Nielsen, 2017; Mukerjee, Majó-Vázquez, & 
González-Bailón, 2018; Taneja & Webster, 2016). According to the approach, media environments can be 
described as either fragmented or duplicated, depending on the level of the audience overlap between each 
pair of media outlets in the environment. Overlap is the share of the audience using both outlets. If many 
outlets have overlapping audiences, the environment is duplicated. Otherwise, it is fragmented, which might 
indicate the presence of polarization among the audiences. Following the approach, I constructed an 
audience duplication network. Each node represents a media outlet, and there is a connection between two 
nodes if they have overlapping audiences. Because some overlapping could occur by chance (Ksiazek, 2011), 
the level of overlapping has to be beyond the “by chance” threshold. This threshold is determined by 
multiplying the shares of users in the general sample who follow each outlet. In the final network, there is 
a link between two nodes representing them if the observed audience duplication is higher than this 
threshold (Fletcher & Nielsen, 2017; Ksiazek, 2011; Webster & Ksiazek, 2012). I applied an automatic 
community detection algorithm to the final network (Blondel et al., 2008) to determine whether the network 
could be divided into polarized clusters based on the patterns of audience duplication on social media. The 
original approach used unweighted edges in the audience duplication network. However, for the proper 
application of the community detection algorithm, the strength of the connections between the nodes would 
also be necessary. Thus, I used weighted edges. 
 
Results 
 
News? No Thanks. 
 
Of the 55,344 users in the sample, only 8,144 (14.7%) followed a page of at least one of the 
major Russian media sources on the Medialogia (2018) list. This answer to RQ1 and possible implications 
of the observed seemingly low share of news-interested users on Vkontakte are further examined in the 
Discussion section. 
 
If Not News, Then What? Jokes, Sex, and Traditional Gender Roles 
 
Figure 2 presents the visualization of the network of the Vkontakte users and the pages they follow.  
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Figure 2. The network of 48,637 Russian Vkontakte users and pages they follow. Detailed 
description of the colors shown is in Table 1. 
 
 
It consists of six communities, as described in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Communities in the Followership Network of Vkontakte Users. 
Color % nodes Main topics addressed by the pages in the community 
Purple 26.0 Humor, cars, technology, men’s fashion, “gangsta style” 
Bright green 23.2 Humor, female fashion, cooking, kids, motherhood 
Blue 17.8 Buy–sell ads, music, movies, work search, sexual partner search, humor 
Orange 13.5 Humor, school, education 
Dark green 11.2 Hard news, politics (pro-opposition stance),4 education, humor 
Pink 8.3 Horoscopes, romantic affairs, popular psychology 
 
 
4 Progovernment pages are scattered around the network and do not form a distinct community; the 
examples are in the text below. 
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The community structure of the Vkontakte network shows a distinct group of users subscribing to 
politicized opposition-leaning content, confirming H1. It is represented by the dark green community and is 
dominated by independent media (e.g., Meduza, Dozhd), bloggers (e.g., kamikadzedead), opposition actors 
(e.g., Alexey Navalny), and NGOs (e.g., Roskomsvoboda). This group contains only 11.2% of the nodes in 
the network, signaling that these users constitute a minority in the network, following H1. This community’s 
users are more likely to subscribe to the pages in it than to those in other communities. The dark green 
community is the only one with a definite political leaning. All the other communities in the network comprise 
rather diverse media and pages, most of which are apolitical. 
 
In contrast to the independent media, the government-controlled ones are not concentrated in one 
community, but are scattered across the network. For instance, the pages of the state-controlled Rossiya 
TV channel and RIA Novosti news agency belong to the purple community, together with entertainment 
media, such as the TNT TV channel. However, the state-controlled Pervyi Kanal (Channel One) is in the 
bright green community, along with the magazines that target mostly female audiences, such as 
Cosmopolitan. Hence, Vkontakte users seeking politicized content coming from actors not affiliated with the 
Russian government form a distinct group whose selective media diets on Vkontakte differ from those of 
other social media news seekers. 
 
Polarization Is Real 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the duplication network of the pages of media sources from the Medialogia 
(2018) list (see the Appendix). Its centralization score is 12.62%, which is low and indicates a highly 
fragmented network (Ksiazek, 2011). It is divided into three communities. The orange community 
encompasses the pro-opposition actors, NGOs, and independent blogs and media. The purple community 
mostly includes progovernment and state-sponsored media outlets with political content. Finally, the green 
community contains entertainment media. The communities demonstrate that the fragmentation of the 
audiences of Russian media outlets on the Vkontakte platform occurs mainly along political lines, following 
H2 of this study. 
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Figure 3. The network of Russian media outlets and their audience duplication on Vkontakte. 
Orange – mostly independent and pro-opposition media 
Purple – mostly state-owned and progovernment media 
Green – mostly entertainment media. 
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Summary and Discussion 
 
This study has three major findings: (1) The percentage of news-subscribing Russian users on 
Vkontakte is 14.7%; (2) the users interested in political content coming not from the Russian government 
and/or government-related sources form a distinct group within the broader network of Russian users; and 
(3) Russian news-consuming users are polarized along political lines (progovernment vs. pro-
opposition/independent). 
 
Only 14.7% of the sample of 55,344 users follow a Vkontakte page of one of the major Russian media 
sources or blogs. However, the finding does not necessarily mean that news consumption on social media in 
Russia is low. It does not represent the news consumption of all Russian SNS users. It is unclear whether 
similarly high rates of news avoidance are found among Russian users of Western platforms, such as Facebook 
and Twitter. In 2011–12, they contained a higher share of politically relevant information and were more 
extensively used for protest mobilization than Vkontakte (Reuter & Szakonyi, 2015). It might be that Russian 
news-seeking users still prefer these platforms to the local ones. Testing this assumption would require a 
similar study into the news consumption patterns of Russian Facebook and Twitter users. If that were the case, 
it would be worthwhile to check whether similar differences between Western and local platforms could be 
observed in other authoritarian states because the findings could indicate these platforms’ significant 
differences in their potential for information dissemination and protest mobilization in authoritarian regimes. 
 
The findings from this study cannot be directly compared with the data from other countries listed 
in the Reuters Digital News Report (see Newman et al., 2018), which suggests that in other authoritarian 
states users tend to increasingly seek information online, especially on SNS. This study draws on digital 
trace data from a single platform, whereas the report is based on the survey data about news consumption 
on social media in general. However, questionnaire-based reports from Russia also indicate the relatively 
low share (21%) of citizens who get the news from social media (Levada Center, 2018) in comparison with 
the global averages from the Reuters Digital News Report. Thus, it is safe to conclude that regardless of the 
potential differences between social media platforms, in comparison with other countries, Russia has a low 
percentage of news-interested social media users. The observed effect cannot be attributed only to 
authoritarianism, the lack of press freedom, or censorship. For instance, Turkey, which is currently similar 
to Russia in these respects, has a much higher share of news-seeking users. Still, in some democratic 
countries with free press, the percentages of news-interested users are closer to those of Russia than to 
those of Turkey or other states with censored media environments. For example, in the Netherlands, 
Germany, and South Korea, only 31%, 31%, and 25% of users, respectively, access the news on social 
media. This highlights that the patterns of social media usage are contextual, and more comparative studies 
are necessary to get more generalizable findings. The seeming disinterest of Russian users in political media 
might be associated with overall political apathy in Russia (Dollbaum et al., 2018). 
 
The analysis shows that the minority of news-subscribing users are polarized along political lines. 
In the audience duplication network, independent, publicly owned, and foreign-funded media and pro-
opposition actors form a cluster distinct from the entertainment media and those funded by the Russian 
government or promoting progovernment agenda. This finding highlights the necessity to consider local 
contexts when talking about polarization on SNS. So far, most research on the matter was conducted in the 
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U.S. context (e.g., Bail et al., 2018; Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic, 2015; Conover, Gonçalves, Flammini, & 
Menczer, 2012). There were few single-country studies not focused on the U.S. (Grömping, 2014; Gruzd & 
Roy, 2014), and comparative studies are almost nonexistent (Barberá, 2015; Bright, 2018, are notable 
exceptions). The present article demonstrates that polarization can take place across different lines, not just 
left–right/Democrat–Republican dimensions traditionally discussed in the U.S.-focused studies. Comparative 
studies and research in the non-Western context are necessary to make our understanding of polarization 
on SNS more comprehensive. 
 
Though Russian news consumers are highly polarized, there is certain audience overlap between 
progovernment and pro-opposition media pages. It is thus possible to breach the existing divide. Judging 
from the structure of the audience duplication network, it would be easier to bridge through the broadly 
circulated media from different camps, such as Forbes, Kommersant, and Izvestia, than through less popular 
media and blogs, such as Tsargrad or Mediazona. The media outlets with a broader reach are located closer 
to the center of the network, thus sharing higher percentages of audiences with the media from other camps 
than the minor sources on the fringe of the network. Another important finding is that though the Russian 
user-followership network (see Figure 2) is divided into several communities, including a distinct group of 
users subscribing to politicized content from the sources not affiliated with Russian government in any way, 
most of these communities include humorous pages. This means that even nonengaged users who are 
apathetic toward the news and political information can potentially be reached by activists and mobilized 
through the popular humorous pages on the network. In fact, this may already be happening, and users 
who prefer entertaining content to hard news may be exposed to political messages as well if humorous 
pages circulate politically charged jokes. Because conducting content analysis of these pages was not within 
the scope of this study, it is not possible to test this idea, which is a limitation of this study. 
 
Another limitation is that the study includes only the examination of the users’ subscription 
patterns, not their sharing behavior or friendship ties. Additional analyses have to be conducted to uncover 
whether users with different political orientations and levels of political engagement communicate 
predominantly with those whose characteristics are similar to theirs or whether different groups are 
interconnected through friendships or form echo chambers, as well as whether polarization can be mitigated 
through active sharing. 
 
Though it is not the focus of the present study, I must note that the network structure of the Vkontakte 
data hints at a strong gender divide among Russian users. The two largest communities identified by a 
modularity-based algorithm, the purple and the bright green (see Figure 2), represent interests traditionally 
associated with male and female roles. The orange community seemingly includes high school students and 
young people, as it comprises many pages with school-related humor and preparation materials for state 
exams. Unsurprisingly, the orange community is located close to the pro-opposition, dark green one within the 
network structure since high school students and young people have been among the most active participants 
of the protests in Russia in recent years. The network structure thus hints at the presence of not only political 
but possibly also gender and generational divides in media consumption on Vkontakte in Russia. These might 
be seen as additional dimensions of polarization, showing that it is not necessarily limited to the political one. 
I suggest the findings of this study underscore the argument that for better understanding of the phenomena, 
more studies with evidence from diverse contexts and platforms are necessary. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Media from Medialogia That Were Included in the Analysis. 
# Transliterated Name Short Description 
1 Telekanal TNT entertainment TV channel 
2 Radio ENERGY (NRJ) entertainment radio station 
3 RIA NOVOSTI Russian state sponsored news agency 
4 LIFE Novosti private news media 
5 Lentach opposition-leaning social media page that 
aggregates news 
6 Pervyi Kanal progovernmental (Russian state sponsored) TV 
channel 
7 Nash Futbol Our Football, entertainment (sports) media 
8 AdMe.ru entertainment media 
9 Radio DFM entertainment radio 
10 Klub National Geographic Rossiya NatGeo Russia 
11 TASS progovernmental (Russian state sponsored) 
news agency 
12 Interfax private news agency 
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13 RBK private news media 
14 Novosti RT na russkom Russia Today, Russian edition, progovernmental 
(Russian state sponsored) news media 
15 Gazeta.ru news media, belongs to Rambler Media Group 
16 Gazeta.ru news media, belongs to Rambler Media Group 
17 Komsomolskaya Pravda—KP.RU private news media, progovernment-leaning 
18 Fontanka.ru private news media from St. Petersburg 
19 Dni.ru: Novosti news media, owned by an NGO with ties to the 
government 
20 Znak.com private news media, Yekaterinburg region 
21 Meduza private news media, opposition-leaning, de jure 
is registered and operates in Latvia 
22 Moskva 24 TV Channel about Moscow, owned by Russian 
government 
23 BBC News—Russkaya Sluzhba BBC BBC Russian Service 
24 BIZNES ONLINE | Novosti Kazani I Tatarstana private news media, focus on Tatarstan region 
25 IZ.ru—Izvestiya news media, owned by National Media Group 
that has ties to the Russian government 
26 Mediazona private news media, opposition leaning 
27 Utro.Ru private news media 
28 Svobodnaya Pressa private news media, opposition leaning, right 
wing 
29 Mediazona private news and entertainment media, 
opposition leaning 
30 Volga News—Novosti Samary private news media, Samara Region 
31 Kruglosutochnye novosti Yekaterinburga E1.RU private news media, Yekaterinburg region 
32 VESTI.ru | ROSSIYA 24 progovernmental (Russian state sponsored) TV 
channel 
33 Realnoe Vremya private news media, Tatarstan region 
34 Podmoskovye Segodnya private news media, Moscow region 
35 78 | NOVOSTI private news media, St. Petersburg region 
36 Novye Izvestia private news media 
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37 Argumenty Nedeli private news media, progovernment leaning 
38 NEWSru.com private news media 
39 VSE42.RU Novosti Kemerovo Nozokuznetsk 
Kuzbass 
private news media, Kemerovo region 
40 RIDUS private news media, progovernment 
41 The Bell private news media, opposition leaning 
42 Anew— news aggregator 
43 Komanda Navalnovo Team Navalny, Alexey Navalny and his 
supporters’ page where, among other things, 
content of his blog and YouTube channel is 
shared 
44 Ilya Varlamov blogger Ilya Varlamov’s page, opposition leaning 
45 Telekanal TSARGRAD private TV channel, right wing 
46 Republic private news media, opposition leaning 
47 The Village private entertainment media 
48 Novoe Vremya. The New Times private news media, opposition leaning 
49 Pravda.Ru private news media, owner has ties to the 
government 
50 Zhurnal “Nozh” private entertainment media 
51 InoSMI Russian translations of foreign media articles, 
sponsored by Russian government 
52 Afisha private entertainment media, owned by Rambler 
Media Group 
53 The Insider private news media, opposition leaning 
54 Vzglyad news media, owned by an NGO with ties to 
Russian government 
55 Radio 1—Pervoe Podmoskovnoe radio station, Moscow region 
56 BFM business news radio station, belongs to Rumedia 
holding 
57 Vesti FM news radio station, progovernment 
58 Kommersant FM radio station, owned by Alisher Usmanov who 
has ties to Russian government 
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59 Radio Svoboda Radio Liberty, U.S. government funded, 
opposition leaning in Russia 
60 Golos Ameriki—Voice of Amerika U.S. government funded, opposition leaning in 
Russia 
61 Ekho Moskvy private news media and radio station, opposition 
leaning 
62 Govorit Moskva 94.8 fm private radio station, Moscow region 
63 Radio Sputnik Sputnik radio station, Russian government 
funded 
64 Radio Komsomolskaya Pravda private radio station, progovernment leaning 
65 NTV TV Channel, owned by Gaprom media 
66 REN TV | News TV channel, owned by National Media Group 
that has ties to the Russian government 
67 Telekanal “Zvezda” TV Channel, partially controlled by the Russian 
Defense Ministry 
68 Telekanal Dozhd Private TV channel, opposition leaning 
69 Telekanal i klub Moya Planeta private TV channel, nature and traveling 
70 TV Tsentr state-run TV channel 
71 Telekanal Rossiya-Kultura state-sponsored TV channel, entertainment 
72 Pyatyi Kanal | Novosti TV channel, owned by National Media Group 
that has ties to the Russian government 
73 Telekanal “Rossiya” state-owned TV channel 
74 Snob private entertainment and news media, 
opposition leaning 
75 Cosmopolitan Russia  
76 Esquire Russia  
77 Forbes Russia  
78 Elle  
79 Harper’s Bazaar Russia  
80 Zhurnal “Vokrug Sveta” entertainment media, nature, tourism, and 
traveling 
81 Domashnyi Ochag entertainment media 
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82 “Ekspert” Online private business media 
83 StarHit. Zhurnal Andreya Malakhova entertainment media 
84 SNC Russia  
85 Playboy Russia  
86 Hello! Russia  
87 Tatler Russia  
88 Zhurnal Karavan Istorii entertainment media 
89 Nezavisimaya Gazeta private news media 
90 Kommersant news media, owned by Alisher Usmanov who 
has ties to Russian government 
91 VEDOMOSTI private business media 
92 Rossiyskaya Gazeta news media, owned by Russian government 
93 Moskovskiy Komsomolets (MK) private media 
94 Novaya Gazeta private news media, opposition leaning 
95 Parlamentskaya Gazeta  
96 Argumenty I Fakty/aif.ru news media, owned by the government of 
Moscow 
97 EG.RU private news media, belongs to Komsomolskaya 
Pravda holding 
 
